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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JANE B. CARTER, also known as
Mrs. J. W. Carter,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
GEORGE S. SPENCER, GEORGE J.
CANNON, LAURENCE E. ELLISON, JAMES E. ELLISON, MORRIS H. ELLISON, J. WM. KNIGHT,
ELLISON RANCHING COMP ANY, a Utah corporation and ELLISON RANCHING COMPANY, a
Nevada corporation,

Case No. 8249

Defendants and Appellants.

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issue in this case is not complex, it is simply this:
Can a dissenting stockholder be forced by a rna jority of the
stockholders to surrender his stock in a corporation and accept
in lieu thereof stock in another corporation?
3
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Counsel for the appellants in their Brief set forth the
facts as they contended them to be, not as the evidence established them, and as the Court found them to be. It is uncon·
troverted that the Ellison Ranching Company, a Utah corporation, had been operating for many years and in May of
1952 was a solvent, in fact a very successful corporation. On
May 19th a notice of a meeting was sent out to the stock.
holders which meeting, it was announced, was for the purpose
of disincorporating in Utah and transferring the assets of the
corporation to a Nevada corporation to be thereafter formed.
The notice states that a copy of the proposed Articles of the
Nevada corporation was attached thereto. However, it is admitted by all parties that these proposed Articles were not
attached, and in fact were never seen by the plaintiff herein
or by her proxy until the meeting of May 29th was nearing
its conclusion (T-62). The meeting in question was held and
the evidence among the parties differs considerably as to what
actually transpired at this meeting. The Court having heard
all of this evidence found in accordance with the claims of
the plaintiff and entered its Findings of Fact accordingly. The
court found in effect that the minutes as written up by Mr.
Morris Ellison subsequent to the meeting did not accurately
reflect what actually took place. What actually took place,
and in .accordance with the Court's findings was in substance
as follows:
A Motion was first presented approving the operation of
tJ::te Ellison Ranching Company, a Utah corporation, and commending the officers thereof. This Motion was unanimously
passed with Mr. Carter, the proxy for the plaintiff, voting for

4
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such Motion. A second Motion was then presented calling
for the dissolution of the Utah corporation. This Motion was
also passed unanimously. A third Resolution was then presented which called for the incorporating of a Nevada corporation, also to be known as the Ellison Ranching Company
according to the proposed Articles of Incorporation which were
then, for the first time, read to the stockholders. When this
matter was put to a vote, Mr. Carter registered objection to
the proposal and stated that he could not vote therefor. He
is recorded as not voting.
The Court could not have found otherwise in light of the
evidence in the record. Mr. Ellison was faced with the fact that
he had written a letter to the plaintiff (See Exhibit No. 2) in
which he acknowledged to the plaintiff that her proxy, had
objected to the Nevada corporation and to accepting stock
in the Nevada corporation in lieu of her stock in the Utah
corporation and had in fact threatened to employ an attorney
to prevent such action. Mr. Ellison attempted to explain this
away on the ground that these objections were made immediately after the meeting adjourned in the presence of
only himself and his brother and not in the meeting itself.
This contention is refuted by the fact that Mr. Smoot, one
of the directors, admitted on cross-examination to having heard
these objections and the evidence shows that Mr. Smoot was
not present at any conference after the meeting and so could
have heard them only at the meeting. Furthermore, Mr. Ellison himself, on cross-examination, admitted that at the time
the resolution which he designated No. 1 Resolution approving
the incorporation of the Nevada corporation was adopted, the

5
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stockholders had not even heard the proposed Articles of Incorporation read (T-62). Under his theory they were in effect
buying a tcpig in a poke." This, of course, is inconceivable.
The only sensible finding is as the Court di~ find, namely, to
the effect that the Resolution providing for the incorporation
of the Nevada corporation and the transfer thereto of the
assets of the Utah corporation was Resolution No. 3 to which
Mr. Carter voiced his objections. The evidence in regard to
these matters will be discussed more in detail in connection
with the points to which applicable.

POINT ONE
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONSENT TO THE SOCALLED ((REORGANIZATION" AND CANNOT BE
FORCED TO ACCEPT STOCK IN THE NEW CORPORATION IN LIEU OF HER STOCK IN THE OLD CORPORATION.
The defendants have changed their position during the
course of this case. When the Complaint was first filed, they
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that by a 2/3 vote
the majority stockholders could force the so-called reorganization and compel a dissenting minority stockholder to accept
stock in the new corporation in lieu of her stock in the dissolved corporation. This matter was thoroughly argued before
Judge Baker and the Motion to Dismiss was denied. The defendants have apparently abandoned this position at the present time, however, because it is the crux of this case, it requires
some comment here.

6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There are three general statutory methods by which the
character of corporations can be changed. However, in each
case the statute must be followed closely and in the absence
of statute, the power does not exist except by unanimous consent. These methods are consolidation, merger and reorganization. Although these three processes have some elements in
common, they are by no means the same procedure. Under
a consolidation one corporation is absorbed into and becomes
part of another corporation. Under a merger, two corporations
enter together to form a single new corporation. Under a
reorganization one corporation goes out of existence and a
new corporation takes over its property. Any of these procedures can be followed by unanimous consent of all stockholders. However, unless there is statutory authority therefor,
none of them may be followed without unanimous consent.
Utah has a statute on consolidation and merger but none on
reorganization. In Idaho the same situation prevails. In the
case of Whicher v. Delaware Mines Corporation, decided by
the Idaho Supreme Court in 1932, 15 Pac. (2d) 610, a corporation attempted to affect a reorganization by virtue of the
consolidation and merger statute just as was done in this case.
In holding that this could not be done, the Idaho Supreme
Court stated:
((No specific statutory authority for the reorganization of a corporation is contained in the laws of Idaho,
either in the) Business Corporation Act of 1929 or elsewhere. The Business Corporation Act does make provision for the merger and consolidation of corporations (Sess. Laws 1929, c. 262, Sec. 38-43), which
carry some of the attributes of a reorganization. We
are concerned here, however, with an attempted volun7
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tary reorganization of the Delaware Company similar
to that proposed in Seymour v. Boise Railroad Company, Ltd., supra, which can be accomplished, absent
statutory authority, only upon the consent and agreement of all the stockholders.
~'But where there has beeri no judicial sale of the

property, a reorganization can be accomplished by the
stockholders only upon the consent and agreement of
all, unless there is some statutory provision or an agreement by which the stockholders either not consenting
or not consulted shall be protected." 8 Thompson on
Corporations ( 3rd Ed.) p. 41, Sec. 5988.
~'There

can be no question as to the right of stockholders to reorganize their corporation, but this right
is subject to this well-defined rule that a part of the
stockholders, even a majority cannot reorganize and
deprive nonconsenting stockholders of their property
or change their contract rights, without their consent.
A stockholder has a vested interest in the corporate
property and earnings, represented by his shares of
stock, of which he cannot be deprived, in the absence
of a delinquency which justifies and authorizes forfeiture. 14 C. ]. 480, Sec. 707. The attributes which
attach to a share of stock are well defined in Ken v.
Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159: HThe holding
and owning of a share gave a right which could not
be divested without the assent of the holder and _owner;
or unless the power so to do had been reserved in
some way. (Mech. Bank v. N.Y. & N.H. R.R. Co.,
13 N.Y. 599-62 7.) Shares of stock are in the nature of
choses in action, and give the holder a fixed right in
the division of the profits or earnings of a company
so long as it exists, and of its effects when it is dissolved.
That right is as inviolable as is any right in property,
and can no more be taken away or lessened, against
the will of the owner than can any other right, unless
8
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power is reserved in the first instance, when it enters
into the constitution of the right; or is properly derived afterwards from a superior law giver. The certificate of stock is the muniment of the shareholder's
title, and evidence of his right. It expresses the contract between the corporation and his co-stockholders
and himself; and that contract cannot, he being unwilling, be taken away from him or changed as to
him without his prior dereliction, or under the conditions above stated."
In the Montana case Forrester et al v. Boston & M. Consolidated Copper and Silver Mining Co., et al, 55 Pac. 229,
it was proposed that all assets of a Montana corporation be
transferred to a New York corporation. Stockholders of the
Montana corporation were to receive in exchange shares of
stock in the New York corporation, except that dissenting
stockholders were to receive $170.00 per share for their shares.
The holders of 13,1,036 shares voted in favor of the reorganization. Holders of 200 shares dissented and brought an injunction suit to restrain the transfer. The Court held that the
transfer was ultra vires without the unanimous consent of all
the stockholders and granted the injunction.
In the Arizona case of Farish et al v. Cieneguita Copper
Co., 100 Pac. 781, the majority of the stockholders in the
Arizona corporation formed a Nevada corporation and transferred all the assets to that corporation. Suit was brought to
set aside the transfer. The Court refused to set aside the
transfer because it did not have the jurisdiction of the N evada corporation, but held that the transfer was ultra vires
and that the reorganization could not be accomplished without
the unanimous consent of all stockholders.

9
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Another good case in point is the New York case of People v. Ballard, 32 N.E. 54, where the· Court stated:
. ((W'"hile a corporation may sell its property to pay
1ts debts or to carry on its business, it cannot sell its
property in order to deprive itself of existence. It
cannot sell all its property to a foreign corporation
organized through its procurement when a majority
of non-resident trustees for · the express purpose of
stepping into its shoes, taking all its assets and carrying on its business. That would be the practical destruction of the corporation by its own act which the
law will not tolerate. Whether the process by which
it was sought to convert the New York corporation
into a California corporation is called ~~reorganiza
tion" or amalgamation" it was the exercise of a
power not delegated and was void. It was a corporate
burial in New York for resurrection in California.
While the stockholders who consented may be estopped
by their acts, those who do not consent can take advantage of this violation of their rights and the state
of New York can demand that those who did the
wrong shall make. restitution.
H

((The fact that the trustees acted in good faith did
not empower them to do an illegal act, and the fact
that there may be some difficulty in the final adjustm.ent of rights because some of the stockholders consented while others did not, constitutes no defense
to the action."
See also in support of this position Moore v. Los Lugos Gold
Mine et al, 21 Pac. ( 2d) 2 53; also 15 Fletcher on Corporations
325.
The defendants, as stated above, have now apparently
abandoned the position that 2/3 of the stockholders could force
10
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Mrs. Carter into the new corporation and have taken the position that Mrs. Carter, through her proxy, consented to accept
stock in the Nevada corporation. As has been pointed out
above, the evidence is quite to the contrary. Mr. Carter, the
plaintiff's son, kept the only minutes of the corporate meeting.
He referred to three Resolutions that were acted upon as
Resolutions 1, 3 and 3, but his notes did not set out the nature
of these three Resolutions. Mr. Morris Ellison, who wrote
up the minutes himself some time later with the aid of Mr.
Carter's notes, showed Resolution No. 1 as being a Resolution authorizing the dissolution of the Utah corporation and
the organization of the Nevada corporation. Resolution No.
2 he showed as a Resolution authorizing the use of the name
Ellison Ranching Company by the Nevada corporation. Resolution No. 3 he showed as a Resolution approving the Articles
of Incorporation for the new Nevada corporation.
Mr. Carter, on the other hand, testified that Resolution
No. 1 was a Resolution commending the officers of the old corporation for their conduct of the business. Resolution No. 2
was a Resolution dissolving the Utah corporation and Resolution No. 3 was a Resolution to form the Nevada corporation
and accepting the Articles of Incorporation therefor. As has
been pointed out above, after hearing all of the evidence, the
Cou1t held with the testimony of Mr. Carter. This is an important matter in the case because Mr. Carter voted for Resolutions No. 1 and 2, but refrained from voting for Resolution
No. 3 and at the same time indicated his vigorous objection
thereto.
The evidence strongly supports the facts as found by the
11
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Court. Mr. Ellison himself admitted (Tr. 62) that at the time
Resolution No. 1, whatever it might have been, was adopted
the stockholders had never heard the proposed Articles of the
new corporation. He admits that they were not read to the
stockholders until Resolution No. 3 was under consideration.
It does not appear probable that the stockholders would vote
to form the Nevada corporation until they knew what the
Articles of that corporation were to provide. Furthermore,
let us take for a moment the position that Resolution No. 1
did authorize the dissolution of the Utah corporation and the
formation of the Nevada corporation. Could that then bind
all of the stockholders who had voted for it to accept whatever Articles of Incorporaton might be set up for the Nevada
corporation? Certainly no dissenting stockholders would be
bound to accept the stock in this new corporation until the
character of the Articles were made known and approved by
all stockholders. Even the defendants admit that Mrs. Carter's
proxy did not vote to approve the Articles of Incorporation
of the Nevada corporation.
There is a dispute in the evidence as to whether Mr. Carter,
as his Mother's proxy, merely refrained from voting or vigorously urged his objections. The Court found that he did urge
his objections in the stockholders meeting. Mr. Ellison, when
confronted with plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, a letter which he
wrote to the plaintiff on November 27, 1952, maintained that
these objections of Mr. Carter were voiced not at the meeting; but immediate!y thereafter. This letter in question stated:
nEarly last summer your son represented you at our
shareholders' meeting and he seemed very much ex12
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ercised over the fact that we had made the decision
to disincorporate in Utah and to organize under the
laws of Nevada and felt that we had no right to
take such action without your consent. He informed
us that he would consult an attorney in the matter.
* * * * * The new company has taken over all the
assets of the old one and your old certificate is therefore of no value to you. If and when you send in the
old certificate, we will send the new one to you and
will also send you the dividend check.''
One of the directors of the company, however, Mr. Smoot, admitted that he had heard Mr. Carter's objection (Tr. 35). Mr.
Smoot was present only at the regular meeting and not at
any conference held thereafter, and therefore, could not have
heard the objections only during the meeting. The findings are
clear, therefore, and supported by irrefutable evidence that
Mrs. Carter's proxy objected vigorously at the stockholders'
meeting to accepting stock in the Nevada corporation in lieu
of her stock in the Utah corporation.
The evidence is also clear that the officers and directors
of the Utah corporation believing that they required only a
2/3 vote (see Morris Ellison Transcript, page 32), proceeded
to transfer the assets without making any provision whatever
to compensate Mrs. Carter for her share of such assets.

POINT TWO
THE DIRECTORS ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR
BREACH OF TRUST.
Defendants' counsel take the position in their Brief that
the directors are not personally liable because it was the

13
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President and Secretary that actually signed the papers effecting transfer of the assets of the Utah corporation to the Nevada corporation. This contention if it were valid would, of
course, not be available to Mr. Morris Ellison, one of the
defendants against whom judgment was rendered as he was
President as well as Director. However, an examination of
this position will reveal that the position is not sound as to
any of the defendants. All of the cases cited under this section
by the defendants are to the effect that there is no personal
liability on the part of the directors if they act pursuant to
a valid resolution of the stockholders. However, it is equally
clear, as. cases we will cite will show, that an invalid or ultra
vires action by the stockholders is no protection to the Board
of Directors and the Board of Directors are personally liable
to any dissenting stockholders injured by their action pursuant
to such ultra vires resolution.
In regard to the claim that the Board of Directors did
nothing in this case for which they could be liable, we wish
to call attention of the Court to the fact that the directors
are charged with the operation of the corporate business. The
directors against whom judgment was entered in this case
were all directors of the Utah corporation which transferred
the assets to the Nevada corporation. They all became directors
of the Nevada corporation which accepted the assets from the
Utah corporation. To say that they had nothing to do with
the transaction is ridiculous. Whether they were all present
at all itmes, of course, is immaterial. As directors they are made
responsible individually for the action taken by the Board
of Directors as a whole.
14
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In this regard, Sections 16-2-28, 16-2-29 and 16-2-30,
U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows:
16-2-28. Directors charged with knowledge of corporate affairs.-Every director of a corporation is
deemed to possess such a knowledge of the affairs of
his corporation as to enable him to determine whether
any act, proceeding or omission of the board is a violation of law.
n

16-2-29. Directors persumed to have concurred in
corporate acts, unless expressly dissenting. Every director of a corporation who is present at a meeting of
the board at which any act, proceeding or omission
of such directors in violation of law occurs is deemed
to have concurred therein, unless he at the time causes,
or in writing requires, his dissent therefrom to be
entered in the minutes of the directors.
n

16-2-30. Absent directors presumed to have concurred in corporate acts.-Every director of a corporn

ation although not present at a meeting of the directors
at which any act, ·proceeding or omission of such directors in violation of law occurs is deemed to have
concurred therein, if the facts constituting such violation appear on the records or minutes of the proceedings of the board of directors and he remains a
director of the same corporation for six months thereafter and does not within that time cause, or in writing
require, his dissent from such act, proceeding or omission to be entered in the minutes of the directors."
Directors of a corporation are in a fiduciary capacity,
and are responsible to the stockholders for any breach of that
fiduciary relationship. The following general language in this
regard is found at 13, Am. Jur. 939.
((The posts of director and executive officers of corporations carry with them certain duties attendant upon
15
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the management of the affairs of the corporation and
the custody and use of its assets. The directors and
officers of a corporation in charge of its management
are, in the performance of their official duties, under
obligations of trust and confidence to the corporation
or its stockholders and must act in good faith and for
the interests of the corporation or its stockholders,
with- due care and diligence, and within the scope
of their authority. Any intentional deviation or departure from these duties to the substantial in jury
of any of the stockholders constitutes wilful mismanagement as a matter of law, for which a court of
equity has jurisdiction to call them to account; and
where the directors or officers of a corporation are
guilty of a breach or neglect of any duties owing by
them to the corporation, and the proximate result
of such breach or neglect of duty is a loss to the corporation, they are liable to it."
In - regard to personal liability of the directors of the
corporation for selling assets of the corporation without proper
authority, the following language_ is found at 3 Fletcher on
Corporatoins, page 168, paragraph 1107:
etA sale without authority makes the officer who
made the sale personally liable. Thus the directors are
personally liable to the corporation for a diversion
where they wrongfully transferred all its assets to a
consolidated corporation.''
The same matter was presented to the Connecticut Supreme
Court in the case of Mills v. Tiffany, Inc., 198 Atl. 185. There
the Supreme Court stated:
nDirectors or stockholders who brought about an
illegal transfer are guilty of a to·rt and may be held
personally accountable for the loss suffered by the
minority stockholder. Nave-McChord Mercantile Com-

16
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pany v. Ranney, supra, 8 CIR, 29 Fed. (2d) 383-389;
Irvin v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., CC 20
Fed. 577-582; Heath v. Erie Railway Co. 8 Blatchf.
347-394, Fed. Case 6:·06; Godley v. Crandall and
Godley Co., 153 App. Div. 697, 139 N.Y. Supp. 236249, affirmed me as to this point. 212 N.Y. 121, 105
N.E. 818, L.R.A. 1915-D 632. The nature of the wrong
being one ex delicto, any person who actively and
knowingly participated in bring it about may be held
equally liable with the guilty directors or stockholders."
For further holdings to the same effect, see the following
cases: Oil Shore v. Kahn, 94 Fed. ( 2d) 751; Spiegel v. Beacon
Participation, a Mass. case, 8 N.E .. (2d) 895; Hornstein v.
Paramount Pictures, 37 N.Y. Supp (2d) 404.
The corporate directc5rs in this case have breached their
trust by having conveyed all of the corporate property away
without proper authority and are personally liable to the plaintiff as a dissenting stockholder. Even under the defendants'
theory that the directors did nothing toward the corporate
transfer, still the holding would be good as to Morris Ellison,
who was both President and Director.

POINT THREE
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT FOR
THE VALUE OF HER PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE
ASSETS OF THE CORPORATION LESS THE LIABILITIES
OF THE CORPORATION.
The defendants take the position that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the market value of her stock as such if sold
17
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on the open market, and not her representative share of the
assets. This position is not well taken for three reasons:
1. The defendants stipulated to the type of appraisal

adopted by the Court.
2 .We do not have here a conversion of the stock itself

as the plaintiff still has her stock. What they converted was the
assets out from under the stock.
3. This' would be the proper method of evaluation even
if the stock itself had been converted.
During the course of the trial, the Court called counsel
into its chamqers and discussed the method of making an appraisal. The court pointed out that it would be best to have
the job done by experts. An agreement was reached in chambers
which was later quoted in the record and which agreement
appears at page 10 of the defendants' Brief to the effect that
three appraisers would be appointed who would value the
assets of the Utah corporation; that the Court should then
deduct the liabilities and determine the proportionate share
that belonged to the plaintiff depending on her holdings of
stock. This method of appraisal was agreed upon by counsel
and by the parties in open court. More will be said of this
particular matter in the succeeding section.
In this case we do not have a conversion of the stock itself.
There' was a valid resolution adopted for the dissolution of
the Utah corporation. All stockholders voted for that and
indeed if the plaintiff had dissented from such a vote, it
would have done no good because 2/3rds of the stockholders, under the Utah law, may direct a dissolution. However,
18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

when a dissolution is made the directors become trustees for
the stockholders, either to distribute the assets in kind or to
sell the assets and to distribute the proceeds therefrom among
the stockholders according to their share holdings. The directors, therefore, had power to take the property from the
corporation, but they had no power in the absence of the
plaintiff to place her share of the property into a new corporation. It was, therefore, the plaintiff's share of the assets
of the corporation rather than the stock itself which was converted.
Even if it were held to be the stock of the corporation
which was converted, still the measure of damages adopted
is the proper one. In case of a closely held corporation where
there is no active market for the stock, the only method of
determining valuation is to determine the cash value of the
assets back of the stock. In those states which have statutory
provisions authorizing reorganization on less than a unanimous
vote of the stockholders, such statutory provisions almost without exception provide that the corporation must purchase the
stock of the dissenting shareholders. Fletcher on Corporations,
Vol. 15, page 245, discusses the matter of the measure of
value of stock purchased under such reorganization statutes.
The authors of this work state:
((The courts must determine the value of the shares
of dissenting stockholders and in arriving at such
valuation all the assets and liabilities of the corporation must be ascertained and considered such as the
company's good will. In other words the appraisal
of the stock should embrace the elements entering into
its value."

19
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POINT FOUR
THE APPRAISERS MADE A LEGAL AND SOUND
APPRAISAL.
Counsel has never been able to understand the objection
which the defendants have to the appraisal as returned, except that they think it is too high. There were three qualified
appraisers appointed, Mr. Leonard Elton, a well-known and
respected member of the Utah Bar; Mr. Karl Hardy, whom
couns~l has never met, but whom he understands is a qualified
real estate man, and Mr. Don Kinney, a livestock man who
is an employee of a company of which Mr. Morris Ellison is
a director. At least .two of these men actually made a trip
to the ranches and conferred with the Ellisons' employees
before arriving at a figure.
Much. of the property was in the form of stocks, bonds
and cash on which it was easy to determine the value. The livestock was appraised on the ranch. The appraisers arrived at
this valuation by taking the market value less the cost of
gathering the livestock and getting it to the market. In regard to the real property, where the defendants seem to have
the most objection, the appraisers determined that tl)e cash
value on real property of this type depended upon its carrying
capacity. This carrying capacity, of course, takes into consideration the number of acres, the amount of water available, the
amount of grass available and all other features that go into
enabling the ranch to raise cattle. The appraisers, after conferences with the Ellison people, determined what the carrying
capacity of the ranch was. They then determined the price
20
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that ranches would bring on the open market depending upon
carrying capacity and thus arrived at the valuation. This appears to be clearly within the direction given by the Court to
the appraisers, and certainly appears to be a good sound method
for an expert appraiser to arrive at a valuation of property
of this type.
Counsel for the defendants makes much of the fact that
plaintiff filed her Motion for Judgment before the appraisal
was actually filed in the Court. The reason for this was explained by counsel for the plaintiff in the record. Mr. Leonard
Elton, one of the appraisers, called counsel for the plaintiff
and informed him that the appraisal was completed. He further
informed him that in view of the fact that the appraisers
had been contacted during the course of the appraisal by
Mr. Skeen, attorney for the defendants, Mr. Elton felt that
counsel for the plaintiff should look over the appraisal before
it was filed. Counsel proceeded to do so and made no objection
thereto except to call to the attention of the appraisers that
the number of shares of Utah Power and Light stock had
been understated due to a typographical error. Counsel for
the plaintiff was then informed by Mr. Elton that the appraisal
was being returned with the correction. Counsel then proceeded
to file a Motion unaware that Mr. Elton had been delayed
in the technicality of getting the signatures upon the appraisal
which had been agreed to by all three appraisers.
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POINT FIVE
THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
TO APPEAL THIS JUDGMENT AS IT IS IN EFFECT A
CONSENT JUDGMENT.
As pointed out above, during the course of the trial, a
conference was held in the Judge's chambers. The matter was
discussed pro and con, and it was agreed by all parties that
the appraisers should determine the fair value of the assets
of the corporation; that the Judge should then deduct therefrom the liabilities of the corporation and that the defendants
should then pay to the plaintiff the value of her proportionate
share of the assets less liabilities. This stipulation was read
into the record by the Court and all parties agreed thereto.
The defendants evidently felt that because one of the appraisers was an employee of a company of which Mr. Morris
Ellison was a director that they would be able to direct the
course of the appraisal. As quickly as they found that they
had underestimated the independence of Mr. Kinney, they
started to backtrack on the stipulation. However, the stipulation still stands and is subject to no other interpretation than
that defendants consented that a judgment be returned according to the formula agreed upon. Plaintiff, therefore, submits
that the defendants have no standing before this Court. Any
error in the Court's proceeding, if error there was before the
stipulation, would be wiped out thereby. The defendants were
not pressured by anybody to enter into the stipulation. They
did it willingly. Now that they have not gained the advantage
that they hoped to gain thereby, they are attempting to change
their position.
22
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POINT SIX
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT NO AMOUNT
SHOULD BE DEDUCTED FROM THE VALUE OF THE
ASSETS FOR ANY CORPORATE INCOME TAX PAYABLE UNDER A SUPPOSED SALE.
After the appraisal was returned, counsel for the plaintiff
made a motion for judgment against the defendants. The
amount stated in this motion was arrived at as follows: Counsel first took the total value of the assets as found by the appraiser and then deducted therefrom the company's liabilities
as shown by the Answers to Interrogatories filed by the Company president during the course of the case. The value per
share of stock outstanding was then determined by dividing
the result of this figure by the total shares outstanding. The
amount due to the plaintiff was then determined by multiplying
the number of shares which she held by the value per share
of the stock. The defendants objected to the figure thus arrived
at, contending that the company had certain liabilities that
had not been listed. The Court heard the evidence on this
point and made an adjustment in the figure to allow for these
other liabilities. The Court, however, refused to allow a deduction of some $400,000.00 which the defendants claim
would have been due to the Federal Government in income
tax, if in fact, the property had been sold. They based their
computation on the theory that the corporation itself would
sell the property in the ordinary course of business. This
matter was thoroughly briefed for the Trial Court and the
defendants cited the same cases that they had cited in their
brief to this Court. Each of these cases which hold the sale
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taxable to the corporation do so on a particular fact situation.
The case which goes the farthest of any of them is the Court
Holding Company case. There the Supreme Court held that
the sale was made by the corporation, however, the facts were
that the sale was negotiated by the corporation and in fact
the original down payment was paid to the corporation.
The language in the Court Holding Company case was
rather broad and it caused some uncertainty in the law with the
result that the Supreme Court in the later case of United States
v. Cumberland Public Service Company, 338 U.S. 451; 94
L. Ed. 2 51, granted certiorari. The language used by the Court
in the later case explains its holding in the Court Holding
Company case and also definitely establishes the law; therefore, we take the liberty of quoting at some length from this
decision:
(( ... One judge dissented, believing that our opinion
in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331,
89 L Ed 981, 65 S Ct. 707, required a finding that
the sale had been made by the corporation. Certiorari
was granted, 338 U.S. 846, to clear up doubts arising
out of the Court Holding Co. case.
tcOur Court Holding Co. decision rested on findings
of fact by the Tax Court that a sale had been made and
gains realized by the tax payer corporation. There the
corporation had negotiated for sale of its assets and
had reached an oral agreement of sale. When the tax
consequences of the corporate sale were belately recognized, the corporation purported to (call off' the
sale at the last minute and distributed the physical
properties in kind to the stockholders. They promptly
conveyed these properties to the same persons who had
negotiated with the corporation. The terms of purchase
were substantially those of the previous oral agreement.
24
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One thousand dollars already paid to the corporation
was applied as part payment of the purchase price.
The Tax Court found that the corporation never really
abandoned its sale negotiations, that it never did dissolve, and that the sale purpose of the so-called liquidation was to disguise a corporate sale through use
of mere formalisms in order to avoid tax liability.
The Circuit Court of Appeals took a different view of
the evidence. In this Court the Government contended
that whether a liquidation distribution was genuine
or merely a sham was traditionally a question of fact.
We agreed with this contention, and reinstated the
Tax Court's findings and judgment. Discussing the
evidence which supported the findings of fact, we
went on to say that tthe incidence of taxation depends
upon the substance of a transaction' regardless of
(mere formalisms', and that taxes on a corporate sale
cannot be avoided by using the shareholders as a (conduit through which to pass title.'
((This language does not mean that a corporation
can be taxed even when the sale has been made by its
stockholders following a genuine liquidation and dissolution. While the distinction between sales by a
corporation as compared with distribution in kind
followed by shareholder sales may be particularly
shadowy and artificial when the corporation is closely
held, Congress has chosen to recognize such a distinction for tax purposes. The corporate tax is thus aitned
primarily at the profits of a going concern. This is true
despite the fact that gains realized from corporate
sales are taxes, perhaps to prevent tax evasions, even
where the cash proceeds are at once distributed in
liquidation. But Congress has imposed no tax on liquidating distributions in kind or on dissolution, whatever may be the motive for such liquidation. Consequently, a corporation may liquidate, or dissolve
without subjecting itself to the corporate gains tax,
25
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even though a primary motive is to avoid the burden
of corporate taxation.
C(Here, on the basis of adequate subsidiary findings,
the Court of Claims has found that the sale in question was made by the stockholders rather than the
corporation. The Government's argument that the
shareholders acted as a mere (conduit' for a sale by
respondent corporation muts fall before this finding.
The subsidiary finding that a major motive of the
shareholders was to reduce taxes does not bar this conclusion. Whatever the motive and however relevant
it may be in determining whether the transaction was
real or a sham, sales of physical properties by shareholders. following a genuine liquidation distribution
cannot be attributed to the corporation for tax purposes."
Mr. Lynn E. Baxter, a tax expert called by the defendants,
admitted on cross-examination ( T -104) that there would be
no tax payable on dissolution if the sale were made by the
directors as trustees for the stockholders.
It appears clear, therefore, that no tax would have been
assessable to the corporation on a sale and distribution by the
stockholders and so the Court properly refused to deduct this
amount from the valuation of the assets. The Court then entered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount the Court
found as adjusted, together with interest from the date of
converston.
It is a well-established rule of law that in converston
cases, interest is allowable at the legal rate from the date of
conversion to the date of judgment. The defendants contested
this matter in the court below but do not contest it here. We,
therefore, are citing no cases in support of this proposition.
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CONCLUSION
The problem before the Court is simply this. Can the majority of stockholders compel a minority and dissenting stockholder to surrender her stock in the corporation in exchange
for shares of stock in another corporation? It appears that it
would clearly be unjust and unequitable to take away this
property right of the shareholder in a corporation. The appeal
should, therefore, be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
PlJGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON

Attorneys for Plaintiff
rtnd Respondent
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